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compete with vertically differentiated products. We show that, compared to the
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the degree of product differentiation in the market and triggers strong price com-
petition, thus decreasing its profits and increasing consumer surplus. Finally, we
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1. INTRODUCTION
The successful launching of new products is the result of an integrated pro-
cess that involves several aspects of firms’ marketing plan, among which the
following three are noteworthy: first, the ”product design strategy” includes the
specification of the features of the new goods, including quality levels, second,
the ”pricing strategy” determines a price for the goods and, finally, the ”promo-
tion strategy” specifies an advertising media plan which helps sellers to create
consumer awareness and inform their potential clients about the characteristics
and price of their new products. Regarding the advertising media planning strat-
egy, firms have traditionally used the mass communication media to inform po-
tential clients about their new products. However, the huge proliferation of new
communication channels has induced a progressive fragmentation of audiences
so, nowadays, sellers find it difficult and expensive to efficiently reach their tar-
get consumers with the mass media. Faced with this scenario, marketers are
increasingly reallocating their advertising budgets towards specialized commu-
nication channels (cable TV, local radios or TV stations, specialized magazines,
the Internet, etc.), which allows them to reach particular market segments with
a higher effectiveness and at a lower cost. However, many sellers find that, in
order to reach their potential clients, the specialized advertising media available
have a low effectiveness, and mass advertising is too expensive, so they must
look for alternatives and direct advertising is often the solution.1 In particular,
and considering the old marketing adage of ”it is easier to sell something to an
existing customer than make a new one”, marketers sometimes build a database
with the contact details of their existing customers and use it to send them direct
advertising with information about new products or services. Consequently, it
is interesting to analyze how the use of mass vs. database advertising can affect
market performance and, especially, products’ prices and quality levels.
To address these issues, we formulate a model of price competition in which
two firms sell vertically differentiated products. Potential buyers are unaware of
the existence and characteristics of the goods and firms use informative adver-
tising to promote sales. We analyze price-quality-advertising competition (with
mass vs. direct advertising based on historical sales records) by assuming that
firms launch a succession of new products over time aimed at the same group of
potential consumers and play the following three-stage game. In t = 0, sellers
compete by setting the quality level of their products. In t = 1, firms do not have
1According to the US Direct Marketing Association (DMA), in 2011, marketers spent $163
billion on direct marketing, which accounted for 52.1% of all ad expenditures in the United States
(see DMA’s ”Power of Direct Marketing Report”).
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the information necessary to target their ads, so they reach consumers by using a
TV or radio mass advertising campaign that covers the entire market and informs
potential buyers about the existence, price and characteristics of their first-period
products. In t = 2, both sellers launch a new product and we study market com-
petition under two advertising scenarios: (i) firms do not have their potential
consumers’ contact information available, so they again use the mass media to
inform them about their new products, and (ii) firms can build a database with
the contact information of their first-period buyers and directly target the adver-
tising campaign to these potential consumers, which provides sellers a low-cost,
efficient alternative for reaching their markets. In this framework, the goal of
this paper is to analyze how the use of these two advertising strategies (mass
vs. database advertising) can affect products’ prices, quality levels, profits, con-
sumer surplus and social welfare.
We begin the analysis by considering the case in which firms use the mass
media in t = 1 and t = 2. This case, which equals the full-information outcome,
constitutes a reasonable benchmark against which we can compute the impact of
database advertising on the market outcome. Later, we analyze market competi-
tion when, in t = 2, firms can use database advertising. Regarding prices, the key
point is that the use of an in-house list with the contact information about exist-
ing clients allows sellers to target their direct advertising campaigns to a distinct
set of consumers, which fragments the market into local monopolies due to the
informational differentiation that arises. Firms strategically anticipate this effect
so, compared to the benchmark case of mass advertising, they compete more
aggressively for consumers in t = 1, which generates a downwards pressure on
the first-period prices. The most interesting effect of this change in the pattern of
intertemporal price competition is that the low-quality firm has a stronger incen-
tive to lower the price, so the use of direct advertising allows this firm to increase
its market share in both t = 1 and t = 2. Further, the improved competitive posi-
tion of the low-quality firm induces the high-quality seller to reduce the supply
of quality. As a result, we find that the degree of product differentiation falls,
thus further increasing the intensity of price competition in t = 1. This explains
why, compared to the solution with mass advertising, database advertising yields
lower profits to the high-quality firm, whereas the impact on the low-quality
firm’s profits is ambiguous. We also find that, although, with targeted advertis-
ing the market provision of quality falls and buyers pay the monopoly price in
t = 2, these negative effects on consumers are outweighed by the positive impact
of the strong price competition in t = 1 so, compared to the benchmark case,
consumer surplus increases. Finally, database advertising is more cost-efficient
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than mass advertising, but we show that the lower supply of quality associated
with direct advertising can lead to a welfare loss.
All these results have interesting implications for policy and business prac-
tice. Direct marketing is attractive to many marketers because the use of internal
databases makes information management easy and cheap. Further, compared
to mass advertising, relationship marketing is traditionally associated with less
price-sensitive customers and higher profits. Our work confirms that direct ad-
vertising allows both firms to increase their market power, but competition for
second-period profits generates a strong first-period price war for market share,
which is reinforced by a reduction in the equilibrium degree of product differ-
entiation. As a result, and contrary to the traditional view, we find that direct
advertising could yield lower profits to both firms. This means that firms can
engage in a typical prisoner’s dilemma, that is, both sellers could be better off
by using only mass advertising but, in order to save advertising costs, they have
a strong incentive to use their databases in the second period which, indirectly,
generates a price war that can yield lower overall profits. Finally, from a policy
perspective, it is clear that database advertising increases cost efficiency. How-
ever, due to privacy considerations in the management of personal data, this in-
formation technology could impose nuisance costs on consumers, so the policy
approach towards direct advertising is currently controversial.2 Whilst a com-
prehensive treatment of this issue falls outside the scope of this paper, our work
provides a new aspect to this controversy. We show that the use of a database
advertising technology generates a distortion in the market provision of quality,
with the corresponding welfare loss, which suggests that a welfare evaluation of
direct advertising should take these negative quality effects into account.
The analysis of strategic competition with direct advertising has received lit-
tle attention in the literature and, to the best of our knowledge, only the works
of Shaffer and Zhang (1995), Roy (2000) and Esteban and Hernández (2014,
2017a, 2017b) have addressed this issue. These papers study the relationship
between only two variables, price and promotion, focusing on how direct ad-
vertising can affect the pattern of price competition between firms. Shaffer and
Zhang (1995) analyze the case in which firms have a fixed-size database con-
taining precise information on consumers, which allows them to both locate and
classify these customers according to their brand loyalty. Given this information,
these authors show that direct advertising allows firms to price discriminate by
2For example, the EU is clearly concerned with the defense of consumer privacy in commercial
relationships, whereas the US maintains a permissive use of commercial information. See Esteban
and Hernández (2017b) for a discussión about the welfare and policy implications of database
advertising.
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way of coupons, which stimulates competition in the market. Roy (2000) places
the analysis within a spatial framework in which firms can send their ads directly
because they are fully informed about the physical location of all consumers. In
this context, the use of direct advertising can lead to market fragmentation and
the creation of local monopolies. We note that the results provided by Shaffer
and Zhang (1995) depend on the information contained in the database, and that
the origin of this information is exogenous. Whilst Roy’s approach provides an
answer to the question of how to locate potential consumers, his model applies
only to a spatial context in which consumers have homogeneous tastes. In Es-
teban and Hernández (2014), we study database advertising based on historical
sales records in a context of heterogeneous tastes and analyze the firms’ optimal
pricing and advertising strategies when sellers face a totally inelastic demand
and compete with horizontally differentiated products. In this setup, we find that,
compared to mass advertising, direct advertising yields higher advertising levels,
an intertemporal reallocation of market power and a higher level of social wel-
fare. Esteban and Hernández (2017a) and Esteban and Hernández (2017b) leave
out the analysis of optimal advertising levels from the model and, considering
that firms compete in prices with an elastic demand, extend the study of direct
advertising based on historical sales records in two directions. The first work
studies the conditions under which market interaction yields perfect targeting
(i.e. all the informed potential consumers buy a product) or imperfect targeting
(some of them do not buy any product) and how perfect vs. imperfect targeting
affects the functioning of a market. This analysis reveals that imperfect target-
ing generates lower intertemporal market prices and quantity distortions so that,
compared to mass advertising, the use of direct advertising can be socially detri-
mental. The second work addresses the policy aspects of database advertising.
In particular, the paper studies how a regulatory policy imposing an opt-in provi-
sion on the use of database advertising (under which firms must ask consumers
for their consent to send them ads with information about new products) affects
consumers, firms and social welfare. The analysis suggests that such regulation
lowers social welfare. The current paper considers that firms compete with an
elastic demand and perfect targeting and contributes to the existing literature
by introducing an additional variable, quality, into the analysis. This allows us
to study (i) how the use of database advertising can affect the pattern of price-
quality competition in an oligopolistic market and (ii) how quality-competition
influences the effect that direct advertising has on profits, consumer surplus and
social welfare. As a result, by considering endogenous product quality, we pro-
vide a wider view of the basic interactions between pricing and direct advertis-
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ing and offer some new insights (e.g., direct advertising can lower the degree of
product differentiation and social welfare) about how database advertising can
affect the functioning of the markets.
The remainder of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the
model and describes the optimal firms’ pricing and product design strategies
under mass vs. direct advertising. Section 3 discusses the market and welfare
implications of the use of direct advertising. Finally, Section 4 contains some
concluding remarks. All the proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2. THE MODEL: EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
We consider two firms, j = 1,2, competing with vertically-differentiated
products. In order to accommodate database advertising based on historical sales
records into the model, we assume that, over a period of time, each firm launches
a line of new products, with quality s j ≥ 0, aimed at the same group of poten-
tial consumers. In particular, we consider a game where each firm launches one
new good in t = 1 and, within the same product line (i.e. with the same qual-
ity level), another good (with different characteristics) in t = 2, and compete in
prices, (pt1, p
t
2), t = 1,2, for a group of potential consumers. The market is com-
prised of a unitary mass of potential buyers who demand, at most, one unit of a
product per period. A consumer’s utility in period t is U = vt +θs j− ptj when he
buys a good of quality s j at a price ptj, and 0 if he does not buy. The parameter
vt > 0 represents consumers’ common valuation of the product, independent of
the level of quality and, for simplicity, we assume that v1 = v2 = v. Consumers
are heterogeneous in their valuation of quality and, following Tirole (1988), we
assume that the parameter θ of taste for quality is uniformly distributed across
the population of consumers in the interval [a,b], with b−a = 1.
Regarding the information structure of the model, we consider that con-
sumers are endowed with preferences over product attributes but, without ad-
vertising, they are unaware of the existence of the goods or their characteris-
tics.3Advertising provides information about the existence of a new product and
its characteristics, including price and quality, so a consumer can (1) learn the
product attributes, (2) evaluate the degree of preference for the good and (3)
decide whether to buy it or not. Initially, sellers do not have the information
necessary to target their ads so, in t = 1, they reach consumers by using a TV or
3We assume that consumers’ search cost is high relative to the expected surplus offered by the
goods so, in the absence of information, consumers do not purchase any good (see, for example,
Grossman and Shapiro, 1984; Stegeman, 1991; Stahl, 1994).
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radio mass advertising campaign which spreads the ads to the entire population
of potential buyers at a cost CA = A. The fundamental feature of our model is
that the goods produced by the two firms in t = 1 and t = 2 are orientated to
the same group of potential consumers, so a firm has a high incentive to fos-
ter a direct relationship with the consumers who purchased its product in t = 1.
However, this is not always possible so, regarding the advertising technology
available in t = 2, we will analyze two scenarios. The first assumes that sellers
have direct access to the contact information (name, address, telephone number,
etc.) of their first-period buyers, e.g. because the products are delivered to their
homes, so they can compile this information in a database which, later, is used
to send them direct ads informing them about the characteristics and price of
the new products. The second scenario considers that firms have no access (or
difficult access) to the contact information of first-period buyers, e.g. because
the purchases are made in a traditional shop and, for privacy considerations, a
large fraction of consumers refuse to give sellers their contact information,4 so
they reach consumers with a new mass advertising campaign. We consider that
the cost of a direct advertising campaign is proportional to the size of the market
segment covered with ads so, for example, if a firm informs one third of a market
of size 1, the cost of the campaign is CA = β 13 , where β denotes, for example, the
mailing cost per ad. Finally, according to the empirical evidence, which suggests
that mass advertising is nowadays very expensive, we also assume that reaching
consumers with database advertising is cheaper than with mass advertising, i.e.
β < A.
The timing of the game is as follows. In t = 0, both firms compete in the de-
sign of their line of products by simultaneously choosing their supply of quality,
(s1,s2). The value of s j determines the quality level of the two goods produced
by firm j in t = 1 and t = 2, and we assume that the cost of developing a line of
products with quality s j is C j = αs2j . In t = 1, firms launch a mass advertising
campaign informing potential buyers about the existence, price and character-
istics (including quality) of their first-period products, and compete in prices,
(p11, p
1
2) for the unit mass of potential buyers. Again, following Tirole (1988),
we assume that the unit cost of production for both qualities5 is c and we nor-
4Esteban and Hernández (2017b) analyzes when consumers allow fims the use of their contact
information.
5The model and the results can be extended to the case in which producing higher quality
is more expensive. However, this extension does not provide any new interesting insight to our
work so, for analytical simplicity, we consider symmetric production costs. This means that if, for
example, s2 > s1, firm 2 makes a one-time fixed-cost investment, which allows it to produce the
high-quality product at the same cost as the low-quality product.
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malize this marginal cost to zero. In t = 2, firms decide their advertising strategy,
mass or database advertising (if available), to inform potential buyers about the
existence, price and characteristics of their second-period products, and com-
pete in prices, (p21, p
2
2), for the same unit mass of potential buyers. We look
for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the game and, for the sake of
simplicity, we focus the analysis on pure-strategy equilibria.
We begin by studying the benchmark case of mass advertising, i.e. when
both firms use only the mass media in t = 1 and t = 2. In this case, the model does
not have intertemporal effects, so sellers face the same competitive scenario in
t = 1 and t = 2, thus yielding the same market outcome in both periods. To obtain
the equilibrium, we note that a mass advertising campaign reaches all potential
buyers, so consumers have full information about the firms’ products. In period
t = 1,2, a consumer with a taste parameter θ achieves a utility U = v+θs1− pt1
from buying firm 1’s product and a utility U = v+θs2− pt2 from buying firm’s







∆s , ∆s = s2− s1 > 0, is indifferent between buying the two products.










respectively, and they compete by choosing the optimal prices, (pm1 , p
m
2 ), where
the superscript m means the solution under mass advertising. Finally, in t = 0,
firms choose (sm1 ,s
m
2 ) to maximize total intertemporal profits. We assume that
sellers consider a common discount rate, δ , and, for simplicity, we assume that
δ = 1. Proposition 1 describes an equilibrium of the game.7
Proposition 1. Let us assume that firms use mass advertising in t = 1 and t = 2.
Then, if v≥ (2+a)
2(1−a)
27α , and A <
(2−a−a2)
2
81α the game has the following SPNE:
























2A < Πm2 =
(2+a)4
81α −2A.
6We focus the analysis on the case in which, in equilibrium, the market is covered and firms









7Regarding proposition 1 (and proposition 2), we note that the game has two ”similar” pure-
strategy Nash equilibria, and the second one can be obtained by simply reversing the firms’ in-
dices. If one of the firms entered first into the market (preemption game with secuential choice of
quality) that firm would choose the high quality (see Tirole, 1988).
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From Proposition 1 it follows that, under mass advertising, the market out-
come yields the standard results of competition in vertically-differentiated mar-
kets, that is, (i) compared to the low-quality firm, the high-quality firm enjoys a
dominant position in the market with a higher market share, price and profit, and
(ii) firm 1 supplies the minimum quality level, i.e. maximum quality differentia-
tion.
Next, we analyze the optimal quality-pricing strategies when firms have
database advertising available. We note, first, that, in this scenario, the game
does not have an equilibrium where firms use only mass advertising. This oc-
curs because, if both firms employed mass advertising in t = 2, the use of the
database would allow a firm to reach the same consumers at a lower cost, i.e.
there is a profitable deviation.8 Therefore, in a pure-strategy SPNE, firms will
use only database advertising.9 We begin by solving the game in t = 2. For
a given values of (s1,s2) and first-period prices (p11, p
1
2), in t = 1, both firms












. Firms compile the
contact information of these clients in a database and, in t = 2, each firm uses
this information to send them a direct ad with information about the price and
characteristics of its new product. Given that a seller’s database contains infor-
mation only about its first-period clients, the use of direct advertising based on
previous sales records allows firms to target their direct ads to a distinct set of
consumers. As a result, in t = 2, all consumers become captives of one of the
sellers, that is, direct advertising fragments the market into local monopolies.
Accordingly, and assuming that each consumer is identified in t = 1 and t = 2






























j −βx1j . For the sake of
8It is also straightforward to check that the game does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium in
which one firm uses mass advertising and the other database advertising. Under these advertising
strategies, there is informational differentiation in one local market and firms would find it opti-
mal to play a mixed pricing strategy, which combines high prices (when the firm that uses mass
advertising chooses to monopolize its local market) with low prices (when the same firm chooses
to compete for the rival’s market share).
9Notice that, given that mass advertising covers the entire market, it is never optimal to use
mass and direct advertising simultaneously.
10This assumption means that the inclination of previous customers to continue to buy from
a specific firm is high, so firms compete under high intertemporal consumer loyalty. Esteban
and Hernández (2017a) extends this analysis by studying price-advertising competition when the
location of consumers along the line in t = 2 is independent of their locations in t = 1, so firms
compete under low consumer loyalty.
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simplicity, we assume that the firms’ pricing strategies do not generate quantity
distortions, that is, consumers’ valuation of the products is sufficiently high so
that, under monopoly pricing, it holds that11x21 =
p12−p11





In t = 1, each firm chooses the price p1j to maximize the discounted value of the












. Finally, taking into






2), in t = 0,












From the above discussion, it follows that database advertising can fragment
the market into local monopolies. However, if, for example, in t = 2, firm 2
targets the advertising and charges the monopoly price, it is clear that firm 1
could react by extending the reach of its advertising campaign (using the mass
media) and undercutting the price, in order to poach some consumers from the
rival’s database. The key issue then is whether, in equilibrium, the market can be
fragmented, that is, if both firms can find it optimal to target the ads and charge
the monopoly price. The following proposition addresses this issue.
Proposition 2. If 4(3−a−2a
2)2
625α > A≥ A (see the Appendix),
2(1−a)(3+2a)2
125α +β ≥ v
≥ (1−a)(3+2a)
2
125α , and a≤
4
9 , the game has the following SPNE:
(i) in t = 0, firms set the quality levels s1 = 0, s2 =
(3+2a)2
25α ,
(ii) in t = 1, firms charge positive prices p11 =
2(1−a)(3+2a)2













(iii) in t = 2, firms use direct advertising, charge the monopoly prices, p21 =
v< p22 = v+
(3+2a)2(2+3a)





A < ΠT2 =
(3+2a)4
625α −A.
Proposition 2 describes an equilibrium of the game where, in t = 0, firm 1
chooses the minimum level of quality. Further, the proposition confirms that
database advertising arises in a market scenario where the use of mass advertis-
ing is expensive (A ≥ A), which is consistent with the current advertising land-
scape where (i) the progressive fragmentation of audiences makes it very expen-
sive to reach the targeted consumers by using the mass-communication media
11We again focus the analysis on the case in which, in equilibrium, the market is covered
and firms obtain positive profits. These assumptions imply that (i) xt1 > 0, i.e. a < 1, (ii)
v≥ (1−a)(3+2a)
2
125α , and (iii) firm 1 achieves positive profits, i.e. A <
4(3−a−2a2)2
625α (see the Appendix
and proposition 2).
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and (ii) direct advertising is extensively used. In this context, it is too costly to
poach consumers from the rival’s database by launching a new mass advertising
campaign in t = 2, so neither firm has an incentive to deviate from monopoly
pricing.12 Accordingly, the use of database advertising implies, on the one hand,
that the firms achieve a monopolistic position in their local markets and, on the
other, that advertising cost efficiency increases, which helps marketers to achieve
high profits in t = 2. Given that the level of second-period profits depends on the
number of consumers in the database, firms have a strategic incentive to lower
first-period prices in order to increase their customer base. This incentive is posi-
tively related to the profit achieved in t = 2 which, in turn, is positively related to
v, which explains that an equilibrium where firms set positive prices in t = 1 ex-
ists only if v is sufficiently low. Finally, the prospect of enjoying a monopolistic
position in t = 2 might give the low-quality firm an incentive to increase the qual-
ity of its line of products, so the equilibrium with s1 = 0 exists if a is sufficiently
low. This means that proposition 2 does not provide a full characterization of all
the pure-strategy equilibria of the game. If a is sufficiently large, in equilibrium,
firm 1 may find it optimal to provide a positive level of quality, s1 > 0. In this
case, the optimization problems are analytically intractable, so it is not possible
to provide an explicit solution of the game. However, extensive numerical simu-
lations of the model indicate that, for a small set of parameter values, there exists
a pure-strategy equilibrium in which s1 > 0, and the interesting point is that the
functioning of the market is similar to that described in proposition 2, that is, it
holds that s2 > s1 ≈ 0 and both firms charge the monopoly price in t = 2. On
this basis, we consider that the equilibrium described in proposition 2 is a good
reference point in order to illustrate how the use of direct advertising can affect
market performance. The following section carries out this analysis.
3. MARKET AND WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF MASS VS.
DIRECT ADVERTISING
In this section, we wonder, first, how mass vs. direct advertising affects the
functioning of the market and, second, how these advertising strategies affect
firms, consumers and the level of social welfare. Regarding the comparative
static properties of the model, we note that the parameter a ∈ [0,1), which mea-
sures the degree of heterogeneity in the taste for quality, determines both the
12If A < A, the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies with firms combining, within a planning
period, the use of mass vs. direct advertising with competitive vs. monopoly pricing. The analysis
of optimal pricing when firms combine the use of mass and direct advertising falls outside the
scope of the current work and is addressed in Esteban and Hernández (2014).
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consumers’ willingness to pay for quality and the competitive pressure in the
market, so it is particularly interesting to study how changes in this parameter















∂a > 0 so, with mass advertis-
ing, a higher level of competition allows the high-quality firm to raise prices and
to increase its market share and profits, whereas the effect of a higher a on the
low-quality firm is the opposite.
Turning to the market equilibrium with direct advertising, it is straightfor-



















∂a > 0. Therefore, we find that, in qualitative terms,
the use of direct advertising only changes the way in which an increase in a af-
fects firm 1’s prices. In t = 2, firm 1 charges the monopoly price and, given the
equilibrium level of quality, s1 = 0, this price does not depend on the parameter a.
Interestingly, we find that p11 is non-monotonic with the parameter a and reaches
a maximum when a = 16 . This occurs because a higher competitive pressure, i.e.
an increase in a, generates two effects: first, it directly decreases the degree of
heterogeneity in consumers’ taste for quality, thus increasing price competition
in t = 1 and, second, a higher a increases the quality differential (∆s), i.e. the
level of product differentiation, thus softening price competition. When a < 16 ,




∂a > 0. Obviously, the fact that a higher a is associated with higher prices
comes, in part, from the fact that this parameter reflects the consumers’ will-
ingness to pay for quality. However, at the same time, our model suggests that,
under database advertising based on historical sales records, a higher competitive
pressure can yield a general increase in market prices.
Next, we compare proposition 1 and 2 in order to illustrate how the use of
mass vs. direct advertising can affect firms.
Proposition 3. Compared to mass advertising, database advertising yields a
lower level of quality in the market, s2 < sm2 , a higher second-period price and a






1 , a higher (vs. lower) market






2 , and, finally, lower profits for firm
2, ΠT2 < Π
m
2 .
Proposition 3 indicates that, compared to the benchmark case (where firms
can use only mass advertising), database advertising results in a reallocation of
firm 1’s market power from the first to the second period. The most interesting
result is that the low-quality firm has a strong incentive to lower the first-period
price so, in equilibrium, firm 1 (vs. firm 2) achieves a higher (vs. lower) market
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Figure 1: Firm 1’s profits w.r.t. a.
share. The improved competitive position of firm 1 lowers firm 2’s incentive to
invest in quality, s2 < sm2 , so we find that the use of database advertising yields a
lower level of differentiation (and quality differential, ∆s) in the market, which
further stimulates price competition in t = 1. All this explains why, although,
in t = 2, the firms enjoy a monopolistic position in their local markets, the use
of targeted advertising yields a lower overall profit for firm 2.13 By contrast,
firm 1 benefits from its higher market share, so the impact of targeting on the
low-quality firm’s profit is, a priori, ambiguous.
Figure 1 displays, for a given market scenario (v = 1,A = 0.2,β = 0.05,α =
0.15), firm 1’s profits under both mass and database advertising and indicates
that, when the competitive pressure is sufficiently high, i.e. a is large, database
advertising is an effective tool to soften price competition, thus increasing the
firm’s profits. However, if a is relatively low (i.e. weak competitive pressure),
the use of direct advertising yields lower profits for both firms. This means that
firms can engage in a typical prisoner’s dilemma, that is, both sellers are better
off by using only mass advertising but, in order to save advertising costs, they
have a strong incentive to use their databases in t = 2 which, indirectly, generates
more intense price competition in t = 1 and, finally, lower overall profits.
Regarding firm 2’s prices, we note that, although the use of direct advertis-
ing allows the firm to enjoy a monopolistic position in t = 2, compared to the
mass advertising outcome, firm 2 has a lower market share and provides a lower
13We note that the numerical simulation of the model for the case in which s2 > s1 > 0 yields
the same results described in proposition 3.
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Figure 2: p22 and p
m
2 w.r.t. a.
level of quality, which reduces both the demand and the consumers’ willingness
to pay for the high-quality product. This trade-off generates a remarkable result.
Figure 2 shows that, if a is sufficiently low, the monopoly price is lower than the
competitive price of the mass advertising outcome, i.e. p22 < p
m
2 . Finally, exten-
sive numerical simulations of the model indicate that p12 < p
m
2 , so we find that,
compared to the benchmark case of mass advertising, the use of direct advertis-
ing can lead the high-quality firm to set lower intertemporal prices. This result
challenges the traditional marketing view, which relates relationship marketing
with higher prices.
The next proposition addresses how database advertising affects consumers.
Proposition 4. Compared to mass advertising, database advertising yields a
higher level of consumer surplus.
From the consumers’ perspective, the use of direct advertising implies that
(i) they pay lower first-period prices, (ii) a higher fraction of the market purchase
the low-quality product, and (iii) the buyers of the high-quality product consume
a lower level of quality. Proposition 4 indicates that the first effect dominates so,
although direct advertising reduces the consumption of quality, the use of this
information technology benefits consumers.
Our last goal is to evaluate mass vs. database advertising from a social wel-
fare perspective. Taking into account that total welfare equals the value of the
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Figure 3: Social Welfare w.r.t. a when β = 0.1.








(v+ x s2)dx−αs21−αs22−CA, (1)
we observe that, compared to the case in which firms use only mass advertising,
database advertising has two effects on social welfare. On the one hand, welfare
decreases because (i) firm 2 supplies lower quality and (ii) a higher proportion
of consumers buy the low-quality product. On the other, database advertising
reduces advertising costs, which increases welfare.
If the savings in advertising costs are not very large (for the previous market
scenario, if β > 0.071), Figure 3 confirms, that either of these effects can be
dominant, so the final effect on welfare depends on the market conditions. In
particular, given that ∂ s2
∂a > 0, when a is relatively large, the level of quality in the
market is high, so the welfare loss associated with the lower consumption of the
high-quality product is substantial. In this scenario, we find that social welfare
with database advertising is lower than with mass advertising. Therefore, our
model generates a striking result, namely, that the use of a more cost-efficient
advertising technology might not be socially desirable.
It is instructive to compare these results with our previous work. In Esteban
and Hernández (2014, 2017a), when firms use direct advertising with (i) horizon-
tally differentiated products, (ii) perfect targeting and (iii) given product designs,
14Notice that, under mass adverising, CA = 4A whereas, under database advertising, CA = 2A+
β .
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compared to the benchmark case of mass advertising, the use of this advertising
technology increases social welfare, but it can decrease consumers’ surplus. The
present paper indicates that the use of direct advertising with vertically differen-
tiated products, perfect targeting and endogenous quality competition yields the
opposite results, that is, direct advertising always benefits consumers but it can
yield a welfare loss.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper formulates a model of price competition with vertically differen-
tiated products and find that, compared to the case in which firms use only mass
advertising, the use of database advertising allows both firms to enjoy a monop-
olistic position in their local markets. This triggers a first-period price war for
market share which favours the low-quality firm. The improved competitive po-
sition of the low-quality seller lowers the high-quality firm’s incentive to invest
in quality, so targeted advertising yields a lower level of product differentiation.
All this has interesting implications about the pattern of price competition in the
market where we find, for example, that, with direct advertising, the first-period
price of the low-quality firm is non-monotonic in the level of competitive pres-
sure or that, contrary to the traditional view of the existing literature, compared
to the case of mass advertising, with targeting, the high-quality firm can charge
lower intertemporal prices. This explains why, although direct advertising allows
firms to increase their ability to exercise market power, this information technol-
ogy yields a lower overall profit for the high-quality firm. By contrast, the low-
quality seller benefits from its higher market share, so the impact of targeting
on its profit is ambiguous. Finally, we show that the use of a database increases
consumer surplus and that, although this technology is more cost-efficient than
mass advertising, direct advertising distorts the market provision of quality and,
as a result, can yield a welfare loss. In sum, our analysis shows that (i) the use of
different advertising strategies, mass advertising vs. database advertising based
on historical sales records, has a substantial impact on the firms’ pricing and
product design strategies, and (ii) the analysis of targeted advertising with en-
dogenous product quality substantially changes the current view about how the
use of direct advertising can affect the functioning of an oligopolistic market.
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5. APPENDIX







































ing back to t = 0, both firms choose the level of quality that maximizes the










15It is straightforward to check that the second-order conditions are always satisfied.













9 −2αs1 < 0, the solution





9 − 2αs2 = 0 determines the equi-
librium value of s2, sm2 =
(2+a)2









the remaining results described in the proposition can be readily obtained.
Proof. Proposition 2. Solving the game backwards, if, in t = 2, both firms use
database advertising, then, given the first-period prices (p11, p
1
2) and the quality









































= b− p2−vs2 . Under these conditions,
the profit-maximization prices are p1 =
v∆s+(p12−p11)s1
2∆s and p2 =
v+bs2
2 and the cor-






. We focus the model on
the case in which v is sufficiently high so that, under monopoly pricing, there
are no quantity distortions, i.e. the market is covered. In the case of firm 1,































∆s so, in equilibrium, the condi-
tion v+bs22s2 > b−
p12−p11





























= x21 > 0, so the optimization problem has a corner so-







































= x22 > 0, so the optimization problem also has a corner solution





. Given these prices, in t = 1, firms 1 and 2 choose p11 and
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2), in t = 0, each firm sets the quality level that maxi-





= 4(1−a)(9a−4)125 so, if a <
4
9 , it holds that
d ΠT1
ds1 |s1=0
< 0, so the equi-














2 , the remaining re-
sults described in the proposition can be readily obtained. We finally note that,






∆s −a always holds and the con-
dition v+bs22s2 > b−
p12−p11
∆s implies v >
(1−a)(3+2a)2
125α .
In order to confirm that these pricing-advertising strategies are an equilib-
rium, we must check that firms have no profitable deviations. Firms can only
deviate by launching a mass advertising campaign in t = 2 and competing for the
segment of fully informed consumers. Let us assume that firm 2 uses database
16We note that, given s1 = 0, it holds that
∂ 2 ΠT2
d(s2)
2 = −2α < 0, whereas, given s2 =
(3+2a)2
25α ,






6(58+ a(79+ 13a))+ 75(3+ 2a)4(181+
16a(15+4a))s1α−33750(3+2a)4s21α2+337500(3+2a)2s31α
3−1265625s41α4), and extensive








always holds, so the second-order conditions are fulfilled.
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advertising and sets p22 = v+
(3+2a)2(2+3a)
125α . If firm 1 deviates by using mass ad-










−A. The solution of this problem yields











Next, we show that p
2
2−pd1
∆s − a < 1, which implies v <
2(4+a)(3+2a)2
125α . To this
end, we note that (i) p11 > 0 implies v <
2(1−a)(3+2a)2
125α + β , (ii) β < A and (iii)
ΠT2 > 0 implies A <
(3+2a)4









625α . Finally, some
















and the optimal deviation profit is Πd1 =
[2(3+2a)2(1−a)+125vα]
2
2500α(3+2a)2 −A. Firm 1 will










5 . Similarly, given p
2
1 = v, if firm 2 deviates, it



























. Next, we show that b− p
2
2−pd1
∆s < 1, which
implies v < (1−a)(3+2a)
2
25α . To this end, we note that (i) p
1
1 > 0 implies v <
2(1−a)(3+2a)2
125α +β , (ii) β < A and (iii) Π
T
1 > 0 implies A <
4(3−a−2a2)2
625α . Consid-




















plies v < (1−a)(3+2a)
2
25α and, therefore, b−
p22−pd1
∆s < 1 and the optimal deviation
profit is Πd2 =
[(3+2a)2(1+a)+25vα]
2
100α(3+2a)2 −A. Firm 2 will not deviate if Π
d













= (3+2a)(18+a(51+4a(11+3a))+125α(v−β ))625α , that is,





625α . In sum, firms










625α ] = A.
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2 . Second, given that p
2
1 = v is the reservation price of low-quality buy-
ers, it is clear that p21 > p
m
1 . Third, considering that v− pm1 ≥ 0, i.e. v ≥
(2+a)2(1−a)
27α and β < A<Π
m
1 we obtain that p
m










10125α , which is positive for all a < 1, so
pm1 > p
1
1. Finally, considering that Π
T
1 > 0, i.e. A <
4(3−a−2a2)2











is positive for all a < 1, so Πm2 > Π
T
2 .
Proof. Proposition 4. Starting from the definition of social welfare under mass
advertising and direct advertising:














(v+ x sm2 )dx−α(sm1 )2−α(sm2 )2−4A,
(8)










(v+ x s2)dx−α(s1)2−α(s2)2−2A−β ,
(9)
some computations yield:








Taking into account that consumer surplus under mass and database adverting
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and considering that β < A and Πm1 > 0, i.e. A <
(2−a−a2)
2
81α , we obtain that
ECDA−ECm > (1−a)
2 [4271+11a(328+61a)]
50625α
−
(
2−a−a2
)2
81α
=
(13)
(1−a)2 [1771+2a(554+23a)]
50625α
> 0.
